



The Linguistic and Rhetorical Legacy of the Prague Spring: Reading the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party Daily, Rudé právo, from the Late 1980s 
 
This study uses a corpus-informed lexicological approach to analyse texts published in the 
Czechoslovak Communist party daily Rudé právo during the final years of Communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia. the analysis aims to uncover how far such texts represented a departure from or 
a reaffirmation of the norms of the pre-Gorbachev era and, in particular, the role that they played 
in the party’s attempt to control interpretations of the 1968 Prague Spring. the investigation also 
considers ways in which the texts sought to construct a ‘new’ reality in the light of the changes 
in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw pact countries. the article maintains that the ‘authoritative 
discourse’ model represents an especially useful analytical framework for evaluating the impact 
of ideological language in the context of the Communist system. the model both helps to explain 
the relative acquiescence of most of the population, and also to track the extent to which the 
‘coded’ message of the approved discourse was successful in slowing the demise of the regime. 
 
Introduction 
This article employs a combination of historiography and discourse analysis to 
contextualize and evaluate official reflections on the Prague Spring, and their 
impact on policy and language, in the last two years of Communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia. The study begins by setting the diachronic parameters of the 
debate, and by addressing the question of the decline of the symbolic authority 
of the Party’s rhetoric. The main body of the article then presents a detailed 
frequency-based lexicological investigation into the argument employed in 
selected texts in reassessing the ideological ‘lessons’ of the late 1960s. The texts 
consulted were all published in the mass-circulation Czechoslovak Communist 
Party daily, Rudé právo, and date largely from 1988, in response to the twentieth 
anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention (20–21 August 1968).1 Most of the 
pieces cited also appear in a little-known volume, Nezažloutlé stránky roku 1968 
(The Unfaded Pages of 1968), which (in a slightly expurgated form) provides the 
corpus for the lexical and thematic discussion (hereafter, Legacy Corpus).2 
The study’s principal contribution to knowledge resides in its in-depth 
language analysis. An empirical lexicological approach of the type adopted here 
                                                          
1 The importance of Rudé právo as (effectively) the mouthpiece of the Central Committee can barely be overstated. It enjoyed much 
larger print-runs than all other daily papers, and it reached a readership well beyond Party members and Communist sympathizers. 
According to Zdeněk Hoření, editor-in-chief from 1983 to 1989, sales peaked at 1,200,000 copies (1,600,000 on Saturdays). See 
Miroslav Vaněk and Pavel Urbášek, Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview 2 (Prague, 2005): 138–71 (156). 
2 Nezažloutlé stránky roku 1968, ed. by Jana Perglerová (Brno, 1989) (hereafter NS). This was the penultimate in a series of 
propaganda works published by Knihovna Rudého práva, and consists of a foreword by Hoření, and a series of fifty-two articles, 
editorials, speeches, conversations, and readers’ letters, dating from October 1987 to April 1989, and clustered around four 
themes: events, opponents, readers’ memories, and recent developments. Six pieces reprinted in Nezažloutlé stránky are omitted 
from the corpus: three not originally published in Rudé právo – Hoření’s introductory comments, ‘Slovo úvodem’; an article by 
an unnamed author, ‘K výročí čs. krizových událostí’, 12 July 1988 (NS, 180–81), which first appeared in Polish in the monthly 
Zdanie; a bombastic piece by the hardline Central Committee member, Jan Fojtík, ‘Pevným a rozhodným krokem vpřed’, 
published in the newspaper Hospodářské noviny, January 1989 (NS, 184–90); and three which barely relate to the theme of the 
Prague Spring – Zdeněk Hába’s article on economic reform, ‘Vlny nestejné výšky’, 23 June 1988 (NS, 191–98); a conversation 
with Jiří Kohout, ‘Kam směřovaly “demokratizační koncepce” v roce 1968: Socialismus, demokracie, občan’, 21 January 1988 
(NS, 199–202); and a series of answers by the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Miloš Jakeš, to questions posed by Hoření, 
‘Nové podněty naší iniciativy’, 25 February 1989 (NS, 213–19). Also omitted from the corpus is the list of contents. All the 
original headings and sub-headings are, however, included. The edited corpus is 65,826 words long. 
offers three particular advantages: (1) it helps to overcome any preconceptions 
and misconceptions inherent in existing historical accounts; (2) it reduces 
possible bias emanating from the researcher’s own positionality; and (3) it 
provides statistical evidence to indicate continuity or change in the officially 
approved paradigm, however marginal the latter may prove to be. A careful 
reading of the texts, supported by corpus-informed frequency data, affords the 
researcher a more objective basis for reaching conclusions about the 
interpretation of the experiences of the past. It allows the investigator to confirm 
the expected, whilst simultaneously subverting intuition and drawing attention 
to the less readily discernible. Specifically, in the current context, it serves to 
highlight the turgidity and sterility of the official word, whilst also identifying a 
number of minor changes in the use of vocabulary and phraseology, and other 
subtle deviations from the established norms, especially in terms of tone and 
style. 
There has thus far been relatively little serious scholarship on the political 
rhetoric of the final years of Czechoslovak Communism. 3  This is perhaps 
unsurprising in view of the Party’s strict adherence to the conventions of socialist 
myth-making and pro-Soviet propaganda. However, for all the predictability of 
the officially sanctioned sophistry, it cannot be dismissed merely as a seamless 
continuation of the pre-Gorbachev era. The very nature of its defining discourse 
theme – the events of 1968 – required its promulgators to engage, at least at a 
superficial level, with more problematic questions which had hitherto been 
confined to the private domain. Whereas the contributors to Rudé právo had 
previously been able to promote a narrowly prescribed linear narrative, they now 
had to partake in the much more complex process of managing expectations and 
countering alternative perspectives. What makes the documents of the late 1980s 
so intriguing is precisely their attempt to adhere to a moribund political credo 
which no longer made much sense in view of the reforms being introduced in 
Moscow. 
Party stalwarts were faced with the invidious task of reconciling Gorbachev’s 
policy of perestroika (known in Czech by the loan translation přestavba) and, to 
some extent, glasnost (although the latter was never officially proclaimed in 
Czechoslovakia) with their commitment to their orthodox interpretation of the 
Dubček era. Their inflexible and immutable evaluation of the Prague Spring is 
enshrined in the seminal work, Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a 
společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ (Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development 
in the Party and Society after the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia [31 May–4 June 1966]), which originally appeared as a sixteen-
                                                          
3 A notable exception is Michal Pullmann, Konec experimentu: Přestavba a pád komunismu v Československu (Prague, 2011). 
Pullmann looks at the function of language in the late 1980s within the context of the authority of ideology, especially in the 
economic sphere, but does not use corpus-informed methods. 
page supplement to Rudé právo on 14 January 1971.4 Poučení was a hugely 
influential publication. Not only did it play a major role in determining the 
ideological scope of Normalization (later generally referred to as 
‘consolidation’), but it also provided the semantic, conceptual, and stylistic 
framework for all forms of public engagement during this period.5 Even in the 
late 1980s, it was the principal referent for the conservative politicians who held 
sway in the Central Committee of the KSČ, and it was a thorn in the side of more 
reform-minded Communists, such as Lubomír Štrougal (Prime Minister of 
Czechoslovakia, 1970–88).6  As long as the legitimacy of Poučení could be 
asserted, it remained a potent symbol of the old order. 
 
Historical context 
The late 1980s in Czechoslovakia, as in most of the Communist world, was a 
time of significant reflection and debate within Party circles and the public at 
large, in response to the initiatives in the USSR, industrial slowdown, the need 
for modernization, environmental matters, and numerous social problems. In 
order to contextualize the pieces cited in this study, it is therefore necessary to 
have a detailed overview of political and economic developments.7 The starting 
point of přestavba was arguably the acceptance of the principle of restructuring 
by the Presidium of the Central Committee on 17 December 1986.8 A more direct 
impulse for transformation were the deliberations of the plenary session of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 27–
28 January 1987, which were published in full in Rudé právo.9 According to 
Štefek, their dissemination was greeted enthusiastically by Štrougal, but Vasil 
Biľak (Secretary of the Central Committee of the KSČ, and chief ideologist, 
1968–88) was at pains to stress the continuing validity of Poučení.10 Reforms 
were then discussed in earnest at the twenty-seventh meeting of the Presidium of 
the Central Committee on 18 February (continued on 26 February). Again 
opinions were divided, with broad acceptance of the need for economic and 
political change, but with Biľak and others stressing the specifics of the 
                                                          
4 Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ (Prague, 1971) (hereafter Poučení). The text was published 
in numerous editions in Czech, Slovak, and other languages up to 1988. For the purpose of statistical diachronic comparison, 
reference is made to a corpus of keywords and collocations employed in an earlier analysis of the language of Poučení. See Tom 
Dickins, ‘The Impact Factor of the Language of Czechoslovak Normalization: A Study of the Seminal Work Poučení z krizového 
vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ’, Slavonic and East European Review 93 (2015): 213–50. 
5 The forms konsolidace/konsolidační (consolidation) are cited 23 times in Legacy Corpus, whereas normalizace occurs just once. 
6 Although Štrougal was one of the Party’s most important ‘normalizers’, he had openly advocated new thinking since 1985. See 
‘Významný dokument našich novodobých dějin. Projev soudruha Lubomíra Štrougala na shromáždění v Košicích’, Rudé právo, 
5 April 1985, 2–3. 
7 For an accessible and succinct summary of the most significant changes, see Martin Štefek, ‘Proces přestavby a proměny 
nedemokratického režimu v ČSSR’, Člověk (8 June 2012), accessed 30 June 2014, http://clovek.ff.cuni. 
cz/rservice.php?akce=tisk&cisloclanku=2015060802#_ftn33. 
8 Národní archiv, fond 02/1 – předsednictvo ÚVKSČ, a. j. 23, b. 3, Příloha I. See Martin Štefek, ‘Proces přestavby’. 
9 ‘O přestavbě a kádrové politice’, Rudé právo, 28 January 1987, 1 and 3–6; 29 January 1987, 1 and 6; 30 January 1987, 7. 
10 Národní archiv, fond 02/1 – předsednictvo ÚVKSČ, a. j. 26/87, b. 1, Příloha I. See Štefek, ‘Proces přestavby’. Biľak was almost 
certainly in charge of the team of hardline Communists who wrote Poučení. 
Czechoslovak situation.11 On 3 March 1987, Štrougal sought to push a more 
progressive agenda, with a speech at the Lucerna Palace, but he failed to receive 
widespread support from other Central Committee members for his proposed 
reforms.12 Gorbachev’s visit to Czechoslovakia on 9–11 April 1987 changed 
little, with the Soviet leader careful to avoid polemical matters, such as the 
Prague Spring.13 Much of the remainder of 1987 was devoted to discussing the 
implementation of the changes agreed in February. At the seventh plenum of the 
Central Committee in December 1987, ‘conservatives’ won the debate over the 
separation of the functions of President and General Secretary, with the result 
that Miloš Jakeš (a compromise candidate, with orthodox instincts) replaced 
Gustáv Husák as Party leader. The KSČ also adopted a resolution guaranteeing 
economic restructuring, together with a new plan up to 1990, but there was little 
enthusiasm for real democratization or greater civil liberties.14 Indeed, a peaceful 
candle-lit demonstration in Bratislava on 25 March 1988 by Catholics 
demanding more rights for believers was forcefully dispersed, and resulted in 
around a hundred arrests. The ninth session of the Central Committee on 8–9 
April 1988 confirmed the victory of the pro-Jakeš majority, and heralded, inter 
alia, the introduction of younger blood into the Party hierarchy.15 Yet, such was 
the entrenched position of the leadership that even the announcement of greater 
liberalization at the nineteenth All-Union Conference of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, in Moscow from 28 June to 1 July, prompted little official response. 
The rest of the Communist era was characterized at a political level by a series 
of cautious reactions to events largely outside the Party’s control. Change in 1989 
happened at a slower pace in Czechoslovakia than in some of the other Soviet 
satellite states. In Poland, the Round Table Agreement between the Communists 
and the opposition in April ensured partly free elections, and in Hungary, in May, 
the authorities started to dismantle its border fence with Austria, with the result 
that East German citizens fled through Hungary to the West, via 
Czechoslovakia.16 Even in Czechoslovakia, however, people became aware of 
the new opportunities for dissent, and increasingly expressed their discontent. A 
number of protests took place in 1989, prior to the Velvet Revolution, which 
symbolically weakened the authority of the regime and emboldened its 
opponents. These included several days in January, to commemorate Jan Palach 
(who committed suicide in 1969 in protest against the Soviet-led intervention); 
in August, to recall the occupation; and in October, to mark the anniversary of 
                                                          
11 Národní archiv, fond 02/1 – předsednictvo ÚVKSČ, a. j. 28/87, b. 13. See Štefek, ‘Proces přestavby’. 
12 (es, nn), ‘Rozhodujícím měřítkem jsou výsledky hospodaření’, Rudé právo, 3 March 1987, 1. 
13 See, for example, Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945 (New York, 1989), 160. 
14 ‘Usnesení ÚV KSČ o komplexní přestavbě hospodářského mechanismu ČSSR a jejím zabezpečení’. See ‘Důvodová zpráva k 
návrhu zákona o státním podniku’, FS ČSSR, 1986–1990, accessed 22 July 2014, http://www.psp.cz/ eknih/1986 
fs/tisky/t0064_04.htm. 
15 By the end of 1988, both Štrougal and Biľak had been removed from office. 
16 By the time the border crossing between Czechoslovakia and East Germany was closed on 3 October 1989, the movement for 
change in East Germany was irresistible. 
the foundation of the Czechoslovak state. Opposition groups, such as České děti 
(Czech children), Český svaz ochránců přírody (Czech Union of the Protectors 
of Nature), Demokratická iniciativa (Democratic Initiative), Hnutí za občanskou 
svobodu (Movement for Civic Freedom), Klub ‘Obroda’ (‘Revival’ Club), 
Nezávislé mírové sdružení (Independent Peace Association), and Společnost 
přátel USA (Society of Friends of the USA), began to make their voices heard. 
Underground music and literature, including the samizdat newspaper Lidové 
noviny, likewise reached a slightly wider audience.17  By late 1989, 600,000 
Czechs and Slovaks had signed a petition for greater religious freedom, 
supported by Cardinal Tomášek, Archbishop of Prague, and around 47,000 
people had signed the Charter 77 petition for political rights, Několik vět (A Few 
Sentences), launched on 29 June. The government could no longer simply ignore 
the concerns of ordinary citizens and world opinion, so it sought to manage them 
through a combination of selective repression, campaigns of misinformation, 
further concessions, and conciliatory gestures (such as the early release of Václav 
Havel from prison in May 1989).18 
Ironically, perhaps the event that made the greatest impact on the public, in 
terms of undermining the authority of the Party and official discourse, was a 
speech by its most prominent representative, Miloš Jakeš, in Červený Hrádek in 
July 1989 – a recording of which was leaked, copied, and illicitly circulated 
throughout the country.19 His address to regional Party dignitaries, which was 
inarticulate, inappropriately colloquial, and inadvertently humorous, exposed the 
First Secretary and, by extension, the Party itself, to ridicule. Amongst other 
things, Jakeš appealed for support from below to avoid being left all alone, jak 
kůl v plotě (literally ‘like a stake in the fence’), he confused the nouns brojler 
(broiler) and bojler (boiler), he criticized performers, such as the pop singer Hana 
Zagarová and the rock star Petr Janda, for their inflated earnings, and, most 
surprisingly, he compared the obsolete state of the Soviet Union with the high 
level of culture and sophisticated household equipment in Czechoslovakia. Had 
Jakeš read from a carefully prepared script and stuck to the clichés and 
shibboleths with which he was so familiar, his contribution would doubtless have 
been forgotten, like most of his other public appearances. The fact that he chose, 
and failed embarrassingly, to engage with the issues of the day, highlighted both 
his intellectual limitations and his poor grasp on reality. 
It is against the backdrop of the aforementioned developments, especially in 
1988, that the texts chosen for analysis here have to be seen. The discourse 
                                                          
17 Lidové noviny, which first reappeared in September 1987, offered a fascinating contrast to Rudé právo (accessed 24 March 2016, 
http://www.lidovky.cz/historie-obrazem.aspx?datum=1987_09). 
18 For an illustration of the range of topics in the public domain and the official response to them, see, for example, Jiří Kohout, ed., 
Čtenář má právo vědět (Brno, 1989) – the last of the series of propaganda works published by Knihovna Rudého práva (referred 
to in n. 2). This short volume considers themes as diverse as economic reform, foreign trade, tourism and travel, expressions of 
protest, the environment, European safety and cooperation, disarmament initiatives, religion, historical agreements and new 
technology. 
19 The speech is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTaTJOAzb0 g. Accessed 8 September 2014. 
reflects the unsatisfactory nature of the political compromise, in which the Party 
leadership officially advocated reform, especially in the economic sphere, but 
categorically rejected the notion of a renewal process (obrodný proces) akin to 
that of the late 1960s.20  The left of the Party was particularly wary of any 
developments that might further undermine Soviet authority or lead to parallels 
with or suggest the validity of the Prague Spring. As late as April 1989, when 
Jakeš met Gorbachev in Moscow, his main request was that the official 
representation of history, especially 1968, be respected.21 Gorbachev agreed, 
although privately he acknowledged the military operation to be a mistake,22 and 
he knew that the system could no longer control the content and style of debate 
in the way that it had in the past. So out of touch with reality was the KSČ that, 
even as the regime was in its death throes on 18 November 1989, Rudé právo ran 
with a lead story celebrating the Month of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship.23 
The failure of the Party leadership to recognize the public mood is even more 
graphically illustrated in the transcript of two extraordinary Central Committee 
meetings on 24 and 26 November 1989, in which senior Communists continued 
to deny their imminent demise.24 
 
Decline of the authority of Party propaganda 
This study broadly endorses the ‘authoritative discourse’ model, outlined by 
Alexei Yurchak and developed by Michal Pullmann, which is based on Bakhtin’s 
concept of the existence of hierarchically superior ‘texts’.25 Canonical discourse, 
in Bakhtin’s schema, depends for its unconditional acceptance on the authority 
that it has acquired over time, and in relation to developments in society. 
Pullmann opposes the notion of a binary opposition between ‘good’ (as 
exemplified by the silent majority) and ‘bad’ (as represented by the Party), and, 
instead, focuses on the role of linguistic and cultural ritual in both the creation of 
a fragile social consensus and the subsequent collapse of the regime. He 
essentially argues that, as long as ideological language is underpinned by 
unambiguous and unchallengeable policies, it will serve to reinforce the 
symbolic order, thereby minimizing the scope for subversive forms of 
metadiscourse. According to Pullmann, the endless repetition of 
hypernormalized, ideologically empty phrases after 1970 helped to establish a 
degree of social reconciliation, in which conflict and violence were rendered 
                                                          
20 The specialist economic body, the Institute for Forecasting, Prognostický ústav (originally Kabinet prognóz ČSAV), 1984–92, 
was considerably less constrained by narrow Party ideology than most other organizations, especially after December 1986. 
21 See Pullmann, Konec experimentu, 202. 
22 See Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the 
Crossroads of Socialism, trans. George Shriver (Columbia, 2003), 6. 
23 Unnamed eds, ‘Přátelství pevné, hluboké’, Rudé právo, 18 November 1989, 1. 
24 Marianna Krtilová, ed., Poslední hurá: Stenografický záznam z mimořádných zasedání ÚV KSČ 24. a 26.11. 1989 (Prague, 1992). 
25 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More (Princeton, 2005); Pullmann, Konec experimentu; and Mikhail 
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Carol Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX, 
1982). 
largely invisible. The so-called decent citizens (poctiví občané), much-vaunted 
in Party rhetoric, were prepared to suppress their misapprehensions in the name 
of a mythical socialist utopia. This afforded them a quiet life, and allowed them 
to pursue their careers and leisure-time activities without the threat of 
disturbance, as reflected in the slogan klid na práci (the opportunity to work in 
peace). People were not required to believe the official propaganda; they merely 
had to take heed of its ‘coded’ message. Pullmann’s somewhat unorthodox 
analytical approach which, in common with oral history, accentuates the 
subjective nature of human perceptions, has been termed the ‘revisionist 
paradigm’ by Jakub Rákosník.26 While it may understate the widespread dislike 
of the regime, it goes a long way to explaining why so many people resigned 
themselves to the system, and it perhaps accounts for a degree of nostalgia today 
for the certainties (if not the abuses) of the past. It also implicitly counters the 
glib assumption that everything was equally unpalatable and oppressive under 
normalization. 
In Pullmann’s conceptualization of Czechoslovak Communism, concerted 
opposition remained well-nigh impossible as long as the majority of the 
population continued to pay lip-service to the established norms, and organized 
their lives around those norms. Social constructionists would point to the 
existence of a coordinated understanding and view of the world, based on shared 
experiences and knowledge, mediated through language.27 At one level, Czechs 
and Slovaks rejected the construction of reality foisted upon them by a ruling 
elite which they held in very low esteem; yet, on another, they accepted it as a 
fait accompli, to which they had to acquiesce. In the terms of framing theory, the 
Party organized and defined official reality, while people created their own 
parallel reality, which limited their engagement with the imposed system.28 As 
Pullmann has observed, authoritative language allowed for a relatively wide 
range of attitudes and practices in everyday life which did not necessarily have 
anything to do with socialism.29 Most people preferred to make the best of a very 
unsatisfactory situation and enjoy the limited benefits of socialist consumerism 
rather than engaging in a struggle against the status quo, which was neither in 
their short-term self-interest nor to the immediate advantage of their family. They 
learnt to differentiate from an early age between official representations of the 
                                                          
26 Jakub Rákosník, ‘Tři cesty soudobé české historiografie komunismu’, in Český a slovenský komunismus (1921– 2011), ed. Jan 
Kalous and Jiří Kocian (Prague, 2012), 13–23. Rákosník contrasts the ‘revisionist paradigm’ both with the predominant 
‘totalitarian paradigm’, which highlights the repressive policies of the all-powerful regime, and the ‘modernization paradigm’, 
which seeks to draw parallels with developments in advanced Western societies. 
27 See, for example, Vivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism (London, 1995). 
28 See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience (New York, 1974). 
29 Pullman, Konec experimentu, 92. 
‘truth’ and their private experiences, and made the appropriate adjustments to the 
way they spoke and what they said, depending on the audience.30 
Not all citizens, however, were prepared to occupy what has been called the 
‘grey zone’ (šedá zóna) between compliance and opposition, or indifference and 
hostility. 31  A significant number actively supported Normalization, either 
through conviction or expediency, while others, such as Václav Havel, had the 
courage to reject it publicly.32 In his famous letter to Husák, Havel pointed out 
that ‘internally our society is not only not at all “consolidated”, but is subsiding 
into an ever greater crisis’, and he attributed the ‘imposing impression of a totally 
unified society, totally supporting its government’ to fear alone. 33  Although 
Havel’s voice was not widely heard outside opposition circles before 1989, many 
would have subsequently identified with his fictional greengrocer, who 
prostrates himself before the regime, in which he does not believe, by displaying 
the sign Proletáři všech zemí, spojte se! (Workers of the world, unite!).34 The 
parallels with shouting carefully orchestrated slogans at May Day parades, or 
using the greeting Čest práci, soudruhu! (Glory to work, comrade!), or flying the 
Soviet flag alongside the Czechoslovak flag outside apartment windows were 
only too obvious to those who later read Havel’s work. 
It was not until the official codification began to break down in the late 1980s, 
and apprehension gradually gave way to aspiration, that people started to express 
their true feelings about the system. As the Prague Spring had already proven, 
once the Party loses control of events and the prestige of the authoritative 
discourse is damaged, it sets in motion a process of transformation which is 
difficult to control. By 1988, endorsed concessions lagged behind public 
demands. Such was the desire for substantive reform, especially amongst the 
young, that changes made by the Party, which would previously have been 
greeted with enthusiasm, now seemed inadequate. Examples included the easing 
of restrictions on foreign travel, the symbolic reintroduction of 28 October (the 
anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia) as a public holiday, the 
unjamming of foreign radio stations, the authorization of an opposition Human 
Rights Day demonstration on 10 December (later declared illegal), and the 
preparation of a new constitution. The concepts of přestavba, cited 104 times, or 
158 parts per million (henceforth, ppm), and demokratizace/demokratizační 
(democratization), cited 18 times, or 27 ppm, in Legacy Corpus, increasingly 
permeated formal political discourse, but they did not greatly inform ideology. It 
                                                          
30 Note, for instance, in children’s speech, the contrast between the official form of address, soudružko učitelko (comrade teacher), 
the contraction souška učitelka, sometimes adopted ironically by the adult generation, and the privately used form paní učitelka 
(Mrs Teacher). 
31 See Jiřina Šiklová, ‘The “Gray Zone” and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia’, Social Research 57 (1990): 347–65. 
32 In 1989, membership and candidate membership of the KSČ stood at around 1,725,000, out of a total population (including 
children) of about 15,600,000. 
33  Václav Havel, Dopis Gustávu Husákovi, 8 April 1975, accessed 30 June 2014, http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans. 
php?cat=clanky&val=71_clanky.html&typ=HTML. 
34 Václav Havel, Moc bezmocných (Prague, 1990). 
is difficult to evaluate the statistical significance of these lemmas, in the absence 
of data from other comparable synchronic corpora, but the former, at least, is 
much more common towards the end of the 1980s than in the pre- and post-
Gorbachev lexicon. In the ten-million word corpus comprising Slovník 
komunistické totality (Dictionary of Communist Totalitarianism) (hereafter, 
SKT), which compares texts from 1952, 1969, and 1977, přestavba occurs a total 
of 904 times (70 ppm), and in the 100-million corpus-based Frekvenční slovník 
češtiny (Frequency Dictionary of Czech), based mainly on texts from the 1990s, 
it is cited 1956 times (roughly 20 ppm).35 The failure of the Party to match its 
reformist rhetoric with radical action engendered opposition in fields as diverse 
as popular culture, life-style choices, the environment, and religious belief. In the 
workplace, however, greater caution prevailed, and officially promoted changes 
sometimes met with resistance. Pullmann has pointed out that managers of 
enterprises welcomed greater self-determination, but criticized the principle of 
worker self-rule for fear of losing their authority. Party functionaries, especially 
at regional level, also opposed some of the initiatives. Workers were often 
equally unenthusiastic, since the proposals were announced from above, and 
potentially threatened job security and conditions of employment.36 
By the end of the 1980s, the Party had not only lost much of its credibility, 
but also its raison d’être. Once the Soviet authorities had come clean about the 
crimes of the past, especially Stalinism, and had abandoned the Brezhnev 
Doctrine (which subordinated national sovereignty to proletarian 
internationalism, as articulated in Pravda on 26 September 1968), there was no 
longer any need for Czechoslovakia to stick to the old structures.37 Yet, for 
advocates of Normalization, there was also no alternative. If any doubts about 
1968 and the Warsaw Pact intervention existed, Poučení and the leading role of 
the Party would be rendered untenable, and the fallacy of the specificity of the 
Czechoslovak situation would be exposed. The logical inference of glasnost for 
ideologues was that the very source of their authority – the Kremlin – had 
deviated from Marxism-Leninism, but this was an unthinkable proposition, 
which would undermine the basis of their geopolitical alliance. As Komenda, a 
senior Party member in České Budějovice, has remarked, Communists at a 
regional level noted with interest that the Soviet Union, which had always been 
their role model, was no longer regarded as such. 38  In the absence of an 
externally imposed ideology, there was little to legitimize their authority – the 
                                                          
35 See Slovník komunistické totality, ed. František Čermák, Václav Cvrček, and Věra Schmiedtová (Prague, 2010); and František 
Čermák, Michal Křen, et al., Frekvenční slovník češtiny (Prague, 2004).  
36 Pullman, Konec experimentu, 87–92. 
37 See S. Kovalev, ‘Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries’, in Winter in Prague. Documents on 
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, ed. Robin Alison Remington (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 413–16. 
38 Vaněk and Urbášek, Vítězové? Poražení?, 318–71 (p. 347). 
 
Party could not even appeal to traditional Russophilism or Slavophilism or to 
post-war pro-Soviet sentiment. 
 
Analysis of the texts 
This contribution to the study of late Communism attempts to answer three 
interrelated questions: 
(1) What do the texts from Rudé právo tell us about the significance of 
Poučení as a reference point in the history of Normalization? 
(2) To what extent do the argument and language employed in the selected 
texts indicate a departure from or a reaffirmation of the norms of the pre-
Gorbachev era, as reflected in Poučení and SKT? 
(3) How do the pieces in Rudé právo seek to construct a ‘new’ reality, in the 
light of the changes in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, and 
what are the implications of their attempts to do so? 
In order to address these questions, a corpus-informed lexicological approach 
is adopted. The use of statistical data enables the researcher to focus on shifts in 
vocabulary and phraseology, while at the same time drawing attention to more 
subtle changes in the nuances and tenor of the debate. The corpus does not claim 
to be representative of all the official discourse of the time, or even of all the 
overtly political official discourse of the time – which would be a huge and 
problematic undertaking, given the heavily politicized nature of most forms of 
public debate – but it is indicative of a defining sub-group of texts, which sought 
to interpret přestavba in terms of the ideological lessons of the past. Political 
discourse might seem an unusual theme to choose for detailed linguistic 
investigation, given that this is the area of language least susceptible to variation 
in a Communist state. But it is precisely the fact that political rhetoric is so 
fossilized that makes it such an important barometer of the conditions of the 
‘socio-cultural’ atmosphere of the time. Any suggestion of a departure from the 
past in the representation of official ideology is indicative of more significant 
developments in society, and has a potential impact on the authority of the Party. 
The overall conceptual and stylistic framework of the contributions to Rudé 
právo is set by Jakeš’s speech in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of 
‘Victorious February’ (the foundation of the Communist state in 1948).39 It is 
poorly structured, wooden, and doctrinaire. Jakeš blames the economic problems 
of the 1960s largely on two phenomena: subjectivism and voluntaryism 
(voluntarismus) – concepts widely used in official circles, but probably 
inaccessible to much of his audience. He criticizes the lack of changes in the 
methods adopted by the Party, the state organs and the cadres for their failure to 
implement the necessary solutions, as well as a decline in ‘the Party’s ability to 
act, and its ideological unity and connection with the people’ (akceschopnost 
                                                          
39 ‘Z projevu soudruha Miloše Jakeše na slavnostním zasedání ke 40. výročí vítězného února’, 25 February 1988 (NS, 6–7). 
strany, její ideová jednota a spojení s lidem). He also appeals to people’s 
ignorance to reaffirm the sole legitimacy of the interpretation of the past 
presented in Poučení: ‘It contains the true view of the events of the time, and 
even today there is no reason to change it.’40 The importance of drawing the 
‘correct’ conclusions from the past is reinforced by the 61 citations in Legacy 
Corpus of P/poučení/poučování (enlightenment, lessons learnt) and the 5 
occurrences of poučit se (to draw a lesson) – a combined total of roughly 100 
ppm. Jakeš seeks to dispel any suggestion that the developments in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 might be a precursor to přestavba by distinguishing 
between the ‘revolutionary bequeathal’ (revoluční odkaz) of October 1917 and 
February 1948, and the reform Communists’ attempts to annul the achievements 
of socialism. He also reiterates the well-worn argument that ‘international 
assistance’ (internacionální pomoc) – a phrase used 14 times in Legacy Corpus 
– averted a tragedy. His contribution is replete with the hackneyed expressions 
of Normalization speak: antisocialistické elementy (anti-socialist elements), 
konsolidační proces (consolidation process), krize ve straně a společnosti (crisis 
in the Party and society), reakční kruhy (reactionary circles), Vítězný únor 
(Victorious February), zdravé síly (healthy forces), and others. The terms 
antisocialistický/protisocialistický (anti-socialist) and antisocialismus (anti-
socialism), are cited 75 times, 114 ppm, in Legacy Corpus, compared with 264 
ppm in Poučení; krize/krizový (crisis) and předkrizový occur 104 times, 158 ppm, 
compared with 881 ppm in Poučení; and Únor/únor/únorový (February), and its 
derivatives antiúnor (anti-February), předúnorový (pre-February) and 
poúnorový (post-February) are found 96 times, 146 ppm, compared with 107 
ppm. The absence of any substantive criticism of the abuses of Stalinism or of 
the inflexibility of Communist ideology testifies to the orthodoxy of his vision. 
Jakeš employs all the formal economic rhetoric of the period, including 
buzzwords such as intenzifikace (intensification) and urychlení (acceleration), 
but avoids allusion to meaningful political change. On the contrary, he implicitly 
advocates strengthening the leading role of the Party: 
The reaction to the new situation, which demanded a consistent changeover 
to intensification, to acceleration in scientific and technical development, and to 
the implementation of new methods of management, was slow. Complacency 
manifested itself in many places in the sphere of management, the solution to 
problems was postponed, and Party and state discipline, as well as their 
operational control, were weakened.41 
The noun intenzifikace, which emphasizes effective ‘intensive’ exploitation 
of resources, has no citations per million in SKT for 1952, compared with 8 in 
                                                          
40 ‘Z projevu soudruha Miloše Jakeše’, 6: ‘Je v něm obsažen pravdivý pohled na tehdejší události a ani dnes není důvodu jej měnit’. 
41 ‘Z projevu soudruha Miloše Jakeše’, 6: ‘Reakce na novou situaci, která vyžadovala důsledný obrat k intenzifikaci, k urychlení 
vědeckotechnického rozvoje, k prosazení nových metod řízení, byla pomalá. Na mnoha místech v řídící sféře se projevovalo 
sebeuspokojení, řešení problémů se odkládalo, oslabovala se stranická a státní disciplína i kontrolní činnost’. 
1969, and 45 in 1977. By contrast, the figures for urychlení are 52, 14, and 44 
ppm, respectively. In Legacy Corpus, which excludes specifically economic 
texts, intenzivní (intensive) and its cognates intenzifikace and intenzifikační 
(‘intensificational’) occur 10 times (roughly 15 ppm), while urychlení, urychlený 
(accelerated), and urychleně [adverb] are cited 13 times (approximately 20 ppm). 
The nearest that Jakeš comes to recognizing the seriousness of the situation is his 
acknowledgement of the Party’s failure to respond adequately to the international 
economic crisis at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s. This is 
noteworthy, since it implicitly distances him from the policies of the former 
leadership, but it completely ignores shortcomings inherent in the structure of 
the command economy. 
The difficulty for the Communist hierarchy was that economic decline was a 
corollary of political failure. By 1988, the Party elite spoke to and for an 
increasingly small minority, and used a language that no longer carried either 
conviction or weight. Propaganda as a ‘speech act’ had lost much of its 
perlocutionary force,42 and most people had abandoned any hope that the system 
could be reformed from within. The fragile consensus had been broken, as 
encapsulated in slogans such as Máme toho dost (We’ve had enough) and Kdo, 
když ne my, kdy, když ne teď! (Who, if not us; when, if not now!), employed in 
the Velvet Revolution in November 1989. The political discourse of the late 
1980s is distinguished from that of the early 1980s not by its greater objectivity 
or openness, but merely by the illusion that it creates of more meaningful 
engagement, especially through its reference to a wider range of detail and 
sources, and through the emergence of different types of public forum. This is 
clearly illustrated by the Rudé právo round table ‘discussion’ of the events of 
1968 in August 1988, in which nine establishment figures (all men) virtually vie 
with each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the official interpretation of the 
regime.43 Were the context of the discourse not so portentous and the content so 
unchallengeable, the exchanges would have something of the humorous 
hyperbole of the Monty Python’s Flying Circus ‘Four Yorkshiremen’ sketch. 
The debate identifies many of the usual themes of Normalization: the 
necessity of January 1968;44 the role of right-wing opportunists in the Prague 
Spring; the weakness of the Dubček leadership; the passivity of the working 
classes; the divisive activities of the West; the emergence of opposition groups, 
such as K 231 (the Club of Former Political Prisoners) and KAN (the Club of the 
Non-Party Activists); the infiltration of Svaz mládeže (the Union of Youth) and 
the trade union movement; the erosion of the authority of the security forces; the 
                                                          
42 For more on the concept of perlocution, see J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962). 
43 František Černohorský and Jiří Kohout, ‘Kulatý stůl Rudého práva a pravdy o roku 1968: O lidech a událostech’, 11 and 12 
August 1988 (NS, 8–19). 
44 After a long struggle, an alliance of senior Party members forced Antonín Novotný (General Secretary of the KSČ from 1953, 
and President of Czechoslovakia from 1957) to quit as Party leader and subsequently as President. 
breakdown of order; the atmosphere of physical and moral terror; the threat of 
violent conflict; the attempts to turn Czechoslovakia into a neutral state, based 
on the pre-Munich model; the Party’s Akční program (Action Programme), 
published on 5 April 1968; Ludvík Vaculík’s ‘counter-revolutionary’ (reformist) 
manifesto, 2000 slov (The Two Thousand Words), published on 17 June 1968; 
Ota Šik’s economic policies, and so on. Yet, where the content deviates from that 
of the established canon is in the wide range of supplementary details that it 
provides, which would previously have been confined to a small clique. 
Examples include the role of Emil Vydra, former head of K 231, who later ‘fled’ 
(utekl) to the West; the ‘adventurism’ of Ivan Sviták, one of the leaders of KAN, 
also ‘active in emigration’ (působí v emigraci); the publication of the so-called 
(Czech) Black Book (Černá kniha), which presents eyewitness accounts of and 
other documentation on the Warsaw Pact intervention; and an article written by 
Havel in April 1968 in the journal Literární listy.45 The references to materials 
largely inaccessible to ordinary Czechs and Slovaks in 1988 unwittingly invited 
further speculation about the nature of the control and dissemination of 
information, as considered in more detail later. 
As soon as the round table panel switches from the certainties of the past to 
the dilemmas posed by přestavba, the discourse becomes more dependent on 
Communist dogma and more abstract, as evidenced by opaque nouns such as 
formalismus (formalism) and existencionalismus (existentialism). It begins with 
the assertion that people are in favour of přestavba, and that the majority want to 
effect it. It then identifies the need for a strong united Party, at one with the 
people, based on the Leninist conception of the vanguard of society and in 
keeping with the traditions of Bolshevism. It counsels against the misuse of 
přestavba and comparisons with 1968, and argues that restructuring should serve 
to strengthen socialism, rather than lead to its demise. The validity of Poučení is 
reaffirmed, with the document being interpreted as a route map for future 
development, and with the current problems attributed to inadequate resolution 
of the issues it identifies. Medveď stresses that if the Party had stuck to Leninist 
principles and norms, the crisis of 1968 would have been avoided, and people 
would not have had to pay a high price for their mistakes. In other words, the 
system itself is immune from substantive criticism, and all reforms have to be 
based on the ossified ideology and policies of the past. For all except the most 
devoted of Communists, the message was one of despair, but for the conservative 
wing of the Party any other approach would have been tantamount to 
relinquishing power. 
                                                          
45 Emigration was perceived negatively by the Czechoslovak authorities (and by much of the population), even though leading 
dissidents were strongly encouraged to leave Czechoslovakia. The actual title of the Black Book (so named because of its ‘dark’ 
content, as reflected in the colour of its cover) is Sedm pražských dnů. 21.–27. srpen 1968: Dokumentace (Prague, 1968). The 
article referred to is Václav Havel, ‘Opozice v Literárních listech’, Literární listy 6.4 (1968): 4. 
The language of the round table is largely predictable and clichéd. It contains 
the standard devices of political rhetoric, such as repetition to emphasize a point, 
the use of reflexive verbs and the passive voice to avoid reference to specific 
agency, and stylized nominalization to impart a degree of formality and gravitas 
to the subject matter. An illustration of repetition is Rychtařík’s phrase slabost 
Dubčekova vedení (the weakness of the Dubček leadership), cited 4 times in 13 
lines.46 Reflexive verbs and the passive voice are exemplified, inter alia, by the 
expressions Bohužel, tyto naděje se nesplnily (Unfortunately these hopes [of a 
Leninist style of work] were not fulfilled), Doslovně se hazardovalo s 
budoucností národa (The future of the nation was literally gambled with), and A 
proto jsou tato fakta zamlčována či zkreslována (And therefore these facts [about 
wages outstripping the growth in productivity in 1968] are silenced or 
distorted).47 Nominalization is evidenced in convoluted sentences such as ‘But 
most dangerous was the fact that, concurrent with the right’s organizing [of itself] 
(organizování pravice), this [anti-socialist activity] was leading to the systematic 
paralyzing (ochromování) of the socialist state organs of power’ [my italics].48 
However, occasionally the rigidity of the staged responses is mitigated by the 
introduction of a less formal and more impressionistic note: myslím si (I think), 
já vidím několik příčin (I can see several reasons), and podle mého názoru (in my 
opinion).49 The use of the first-person perspective, as would befit a forum of this 
type in a more open society, helps to promote a stronger illusion of polyglossia 
than had previously been the norm in Czechoslovakia. Even Party loyalists who 
shared the same views, and had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, 
now appreciated the importance of creating the impression of a dialogue which 
allowed for at least some independent thought. 
The round table serves to reaffirm the Party’s bifurcate distinction between 
positive and negative. On the positive side in Legacy Corpus are terms such 
bolševismus (Bolshevism) and its cognates, cited 6 times; (Klement) Gottwald 
(Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, 1946– 48, and President, 1948–53) and 
cognates, with 16 citations; jednota (unity) and jednotný (united), 42 citations; 
references to Lenin and Marx, including marxismus-leninismus (Marxism-
Leninism) and its derivatives, 92 citations; pevný (firm), upevnit (to strengthen) 
and cognates, 47; poctivý/poctivě (decent/decently), 43; princip/principiální 
(principle/ principled), 31; rozhodný/rozhodující/rozhodně (decisive/decisively), 
41; and zdravý (healthy), 14, used almost exclusively of adherents of the Party 
line. Negative expressions include antisocialistický/protisocialistický (anti-
socialist) and antisocialismus  (antisocialism), 86; 
                                                          
46 Černohorský and Kohout, ‘Kulatý stůl’,10. 
47 Černohorský and Kohout, ‘Kulatý stůl’, 8, 16, and 11. 
48 Černohorský and Kohout, ‘Kulatý stůl’, 14: Ale nejnebezpečnější bylo to, že souběžně s organizováním pravice docházelo k 
systematickému ochromování socialistických státních mocenských orgánů. 
49 Černohorský and Kohout, ‘Kulatý stůl’, 10 and 13. 
antikomunista/antikomunistický/protikomunistický (anti-Communist) and 
antikomunismus (anti-Communism), 33; destrukce (destruction) and cognates, 
15 citations; demagogie (demagoguery) and cognates, 16; demontáž 
(dismantling), 9; dezorientovat (to disorientate) and derivatives, 9; 
kontrarevoluce/kontrarevoluční (counter-revolution/counter-revolutionary), 66; 
nejednotný (disunited) and cognates, 7; nepřátelé (enemies) and cognates, 24; 
oportunismus (opportunism) and cognates, 41; pravice (the right) and cognates, 
256; revize/revizionismus (revision/revisionismus) and cognates, 50; subjektivní 
(subjective) and cognates, 17; Západ (the West) and cognates, 50; and 
živly/elementy (elements) and cognates, 25. A similar dichotomy also applies 
beyond the single-word level to collocations: dělnické hnutí (workers’ 
movement),6 citations; dělnická třída (working class), 42; revoluční 
avantgarda/předvoj (revolutionary vanguard), 4; vs. 
antisocialistické/protisocialistické živly/elementy (antisocialist elements), 7; 
antisocialistické/protisocialistické sily (anti-socialist forces), 47; and pravicově 
oportunistický (right-wing opportunist), 15 (10 times in conjunction with síly). 
In relative terms, there are fewer overtly negative referents in Legacy Corpus 
than in Poučení – for example, the citations for pravice (the right) and cognates 
equate to 389 ppm and 1148 ppm, respectively. Moreover, Legacy Corpus pays 
slightly less attention than Poučení to the mistakes of Communism, as reflected 
in the phrases nedostatky/nedostatečný (shortcomings/inadequate), 35 citations 
or 53 ppm, vs. 94 ppm, and chyba/chybný/omyl (mistake/mistaken/error), 41 or 
62 ppm, vs. 75 ppm. This may be partly attributable to the time that has elapsed 
since 1968, but it may also denote a subtle change in emphasis and tone. Whether 
or not Rudé právo was deliberating seeking to mitigate the failings of the past, 
the overall message is still that the interpretation of the Prague Spring and the 
ideology of the Party have not changed significantly. The validity of Communist 
dogma is reinforced by the repetition of several of the other buzzwords, such as 
boj (battle) and cognates, 95 citations; ideový (ideological) and cognates, 220; 
KSČ, 321, including 170 times in the title ÚV KSČ (Central Committee of the 
KSČ); síla/síly (strength/forces), 113; strana (party) and derivatives, 766, or 
1164 ppm, compared with 1786 ppm in Poučení, excluding uses where it means 
‘side’ or ‘hand’; and vedoucí, 94, including 67 times in the collocation vedoucí 
úloha (leading role). The sacred cows of Communism, particularly the leading 
role of the Party, the founding fathers of the socialist state and the Soviet model, 
remain immune from criticism. It is not by accident that strana is the most 
common non-function word in all three of the corpora consulted: Legacy Corpus, 
Poučení, and SKT. 
The documents may seek to belie the declining legitimacy of the established 
order, but the very re-emergence of the Prague Spring as a topical discourse 
theme testifies to the intractability of the Party’s problems. The contributors to 
Rudé právo clearly did not have any desire to push the bounds of the permissible, 
as had their predecessors two decades earlier, but they simply had no choice other 
than to respond to calls for more open dialogue, emanating from the easing of 
restrictions. They were faced with an insoluble, but delightfully paradoxical, 
dilemma: how to acknowledge the merits of glasnost/glasnosť, cited 6 times 
(with variable spelling, which confirms its somewhat marginal status), and its 
more Czech-sounding equivalent informovanost (being informed), cited 10 
times, whilst simultaneously circumscribing the semantic range and applications 
of these concepts. On the one hand, they could not ignore the parallels between 
Gorbachev’s policies and the renewal of the 1960s; on the other, the mere act of 
denying the similarities invited more comparisons with the past, and further 
eroded the symbolism of the official word. The more they strove to counter 
alternative points of view, the more they engaged with, and thereby publicized 
and legitimized, the demands of the opposition. A significant part of this 
engagement entailed the adoption of terms of reference which did not conform 
to the approved semantic nomenclature. The Party had always had difficulties in 
imposing new meanings on established political concepts, not least because of 
Czechoslovakia’s liberal democratic (or ‘bourgeois’) traditions, but the problems 
were compounded by the events of 1968. Until the mid-1980s, the Party managed 
the situation by largely confining discussion of the Prague Spring to the 
distortions of the Novotný era, Soviet friendship, and the importance of 
proletarian internationalism, as reflected in the headline article of Rudé právo on 
the tenth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention. 50  Obfuscatory and 
ideologically motivated expressions, such as krizové období (crisis period) and 
krizový stav (state of crisis), substituted for terminology more redolent of the 
positive spirit of revival. 
By the late 1980s, it was impossible to talk about 1968 without at least 
acknowledging the vocabulary of the reform Communists, not least because this 
corresponded to the private usage of much of the general population. The 
dilemma for the hardliners was that after the Soviet occupation the official terms 
of reference smacked of perfidy and betrayal. The difficulties posed to the Party 
ideologues are perhaps best exemplified by Skalický’s tortuous explanation of 
the differences in terminology, below. (In order to highlight the reform 
Communists’ perspective on their role in the Prague Spring, semantically loaded 
terms that are not in inverted commas are glossed in square brackets.) 
In their public appearances and the media, the spokesmen of the right [i.e. 
non-hardliners] hid behind demagogic slogans [i.e. used reformist phrases] such 
as ‘socialism with a human face’, ‘democratic socialism’ etc., and made 
themselves out to be [i.e. called themselves] ‘progressives’, whereas they 
abusively [i.e. correctly] called their opponents, the true supporters of socialism 
[i.e. Marxism-Leninism], ‘conservatives’, and ultimately began to slander [i.e. 
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depict] them as ‘traitors to the country’. They represented the retreat from 
socialism, its de facto dismantling, as the ‘renovation’ of socialism, as a ‘new 
model’ of socialism.51 
Implicit in Skalický’s comments is an acceptance that the official logocracy 
no longer enjoyed the same power as it had done previously. The words were the 
same, but their impact was diminished. The fact that he felt the need to reiterate 
the same metalinguistic points made in Poučení seventeen years earlier confirms 
that the argument in favour of Normalization had been far from universally 
accepted. 
The axiological contrast between the descriptors relating to the two opposing 
camps in the texts is striking. On the one side are the proponents of change, as 
reflected in terms such as progresivní (progressive) and its cognates, cited 9 
times (5 times in inverted commas), and radikální (radical) and cognates, cited 
14 times (6 times in inverted commas). On the other side are the supporters of 
Marxism-Leninism, as evidenced by lexical items such as dogmatický 
(dogmatic) and cognates, cited 18 times (3 times in inverted commas); 
konzervativní (conservative) and cognates, including twice in the slang form 
konzerva (conservative), cited 18 times (9 times in inverted commas); levice (the 
left) and cognates, cited 11 times; and sektářský (sectarian) and cognates, cited 6 
times (once in inverted commas).52 The 14 citations of zrádce (traitor), zrádcový 
(treacherous), and zradit (to betray), 7 in inverted commas, and the 9 citations of 
kolaborant (collaborator) and kolaborace (collaboration), 7 in inverted commas, 
applied to the pro-Moscow stalwarts, are particularly telling, in view of the 
strong associations in Party mythology of the terms with the Munich ‘betrayal’ 
of 1938. (The lemmas Mnichov/mnichovský [Munich] and předmnichovský [pre-
Munich] occur 16 times in Legacy Corpus.) Equally revealing are the phrases 
pražské jaro (Prague Spring), coined by Western journalists on the basis of the 
International Music Festival of the same name, and socialismus s lidskou tváří 
(socialism with a human face), which inevitably invited comparisons with really 
existing socialism. The former is cited 12 times: twice preceded by takzvané/tzv. 
(so-called), 9 times in inverted commas (including twice in the collocation ‘muži 
pražského jara’ [‘the men of the Prague Spring’]), and once in a quotation from 
Die Welt from 28 March 1968.53 The collocation s lidskou tváří (once preceded 
by obroditel [revivalist] and once by politika [politics]) appears 7 times, 3 times 
in inverted commas. Significant attention is also paid to the contentious 
                                                          
51 Ladislav Skalický, ‘Zamyšlení nad zasedáním ÚV KSČ před dvaceti lety: Leden a dnešek’ (4 January 1988) (NS, 28–35 [p. 32]): 
‘Ve svých veřejných vystoupeních a ve sdělovacích prostředcích se mluvčí pravice maskovali demagogickými hesly typu 
„socialismus s lidskou tváří“, „demokratický socialismus“ apod., vydávali se za „progresivisty“, zatímco své odpůrce, věrné 
stoupence socialismu, hanlivě nazývali „konzervativci“ a nakonec je začali pomlouvat jako „zrádce vlasti“. Ústup od socialismu, 
jeho faktickou demontáž vydávali za „obrodu“ socialismu, za „nový model“ socialismu’. 
52 Both ‘levice’ and ‘pravice’ are used pejoratively by supporters of the opposite sides, but ‘levice’ sometimes also had negative 
connotations for more pragmatic normalizers. See, for example, Lubomír Štrougal, Paměti a úvahy (Prague, 2009), 63 and 204. 
53 The functions of inverted commas and takzvané/tzv. are considered in detail in Dickins, ‘The Impact Factor of the Language of 
Czechoslovak Normalization’, 240–41. 
document Akční program – cited 18 times – which advocated a specifically 
Czechoslovak path to socialism.54 This reformist manifesto posed a particular 
problem to the Party in the late 1980s, since it had represented a compromise 
which remained attractive to many Czechs and Slovaks, especially erstwhile 
Party members. 
The recognition of the ‘new’ realities drew greater attention to the existence 
of more specific ideological enemies. Amongst the hardliners’ most problematic 
opponents were Alexander Dubček (First Secretary of the KSČ, from 5 January 
1968 to 17 April 1969) and Václav Havel. Although Dubček is mentioned 33 
times by name in Poučení, he had become virtually a non-person after the early 
1970s, except in more specialized sources. This is borne out by SKT, in which 
citations of his name vary from none in 1952, to 68 ppm in 1969, to just 5 ppm 
in 1977.55 When Dubček was referred to explicitly, as in encyclopaedia entries, 
he was summarily dismissed in terms such as ‘a representative of revisionism 
and right-wing opportunism’ or ‘the leading representative of the rightwing 
opportunistic forces in the Central Committee of the KSČ’. 56  However, 
following his interview with the Italian newspaper L’Unità in January 1988, in 
which he likened Gorbachev’s reforms to the Prague Spring,57 and his trip to 
Italy in November 1988, he could no longer simply be written out of history. The 
Party had to address the fact that an increasing number of people (especially ex-
Communists) were viewing him as a pioneer of přestavba. Note the title of the 
piece describing his trip to Italy, Na dotaz čtenáře […] (In Answer to a Reader), 
which includes Jakeš’s response to suggestions that Dubček might return to 
public life: ‘Alexandra Dubčeka považujeme u nás za soukromou osobu’ (We 
regard Alexander Dubček here as a private person). 58  The dismissive and 
unpleasant tone of some of the comments relating to Dubček in Legacy Corpus 
illuminates the degree of concern at his reappearance: jak bývalý první tajemník 
ÚV strany Alexander Dubček krok za krokem ustupoval tlaku reakce (as former 
First Secretary of the Central Committee, Alexander Dubček yielded step by step 
to the pressure of reaction), Dubčekova ješitnost a samolibost (Dubček’s vanity 
and smugness), nerozhodnost Alexandra Dubčeka (the indecisiveness of 
Alexander Dubček), and so on. 59  Dubček is twice accorded the less than 
flattering epithet občan (citizen), which is juxtaposed with the title soudruh 
                                                          
54 See, for example, ‘Přestavba a Poučení z krizového vývoje: Alois Indra, člen předsednictva Ústředního výboru. KSČ, předseda 
Federálního shromáždění ČSSR’ (NS, 163–74). 
55 The treatment of Dubček in Poučení, written shortly after he had been ousted from power, is more circumspect because he was 
still very much in people’s memory. 
56 See Unnamed eds, Malý slovník encyklopedický A–Ž (Prague, 1972), 265, and Bohumil Kvasil, et al., Malá československá 
encyklopedie, 6 vols (Prague, 1984 [A−Č], 1985 [D−Ch], 1986 [I−L], 1986 [M−Pol], 1987 [Pom−S], and 1987 [Š−Ž]), vol. 2, 
213. 
57 Alexander Dubček and Renzo Foa, ‘Alexander Dubcek «Mi sia restituito l’onore politico»’, L’Unità, 10 January  
1988, 15–18. 
58 Unnamed eds, ‘Na dotaz čtenáře: K jedné soukromé cestě do Itálie’, 16 December 1988 (NS, 129–30 [p. 130]). 
59 Rudolf Vaněk, ‘Má vzpomínka na rok 1968’, 26 March 1988 (NS, 139); Milan Matouš, ‘Dubčekova cesta od tragédie k frašce’, 
10 August 1988 (NS, 121–28 [p. 126]); and František Ráža, ‘Dnes jsou uraženi’, 17 August 1988 (NS, 142). 
(comrade), applied 13 times to Jakeš and 7 times to Husák. 60  Only one 
contribution to Legacy Corpus – a piece by a certain Dr Kozel in April 1989 – 
seeks to strike a slightly more nuanced approach to Dubček. The author, who had 
served with Dubček from 1968, but resigned from his role as a Party ideologist 
in January 1970, is unambiguously negative in his evaluation of his former 
leader’s political skills and lack of experience, which he contrasts with those of 
the pre-war generation of Communists. But he adopts a softer attitude to Dubček 
as a human being, describing him as ‘a kind and good-hearted person’ (milý a 
dobrosrdečný člověk), who suffered the ‘great human misfortune’ (velké lidské 
neštěstí) of believing in his own ‘exceptionality’ (výjimečnost).61 Needless to 
say, kindness and good-heartedness are not personal attributes rated highly in the 
Communist world view. 
An even more intractable set of problems was posed by Havel, who had 
stubbornly refused to abandon his native land in favour of exile. The Havel 
family name is referred to directly 46 times, compared with once in Poučení, 
while Charta 77 (Charter 77) and Výbor pro obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných 
(VONS) (The Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted), with 
which he is inextricably linked, are cited 13 and 3 times, respectively. Havel’s 
arguments are not specifically addressed, but, instead, the contributors employ 
abusive ad hominems to sully his personal reputation. The attack on Havel’s 
bourgeois origins, in an unattributed piece, expands on the criticism of two 
earlier articles, which also allude negatively to his privileged background.62 The 
uncompromising nature of this contribution is worthy of note, especially in view 
of the date of its publication: late February 1989.63 The piece enumerates the 
supposed compromises made by his affluent forebears, including his 
grandfather’s allegedly good relations with the Nazis, and his uncle’s position as 
Rotary Club President, to suggest guilt by association. It then outlines Havel’s 
own gradual anti-Communist progression, from his activities in 1968, to his 
defence of the Czech rock band, Plastic People of the Universe, with their 
vulgární texty (vulgar texts), to his role in the drafting of Charter 77, described 
pejoratively as a pamflet (pamphlet), 64  to the defaming of Czechoslovakia 
abroad, and to his increasing anti-state activity, including the founding of VONS. 
                                                          
60 Arnošt Bak and Jaroslav Kojzar, ‘Jak manipulují s... Alexandrem Dubčekem: Opravdu jen „mylná informace“?’, 16 July 1988 
(NS, 119–20 [p. 119]); and Unnamed eds, ‘Na dotaz čtenáře’ (NS, 128). 
61 Jaroslav Kozel, ‘Strana vždy našla dost sil k zvládnutí nejsložitějších úkolů doby: Je čas se vyjádřit’, 19 April 1989 (NS, 131–35 
[pp. 132, 134]). The piece is also noteworthy for its superficial self-criticism. 
62 Unnamed eds, ‘Kdo je Václav Havel’, 23 February 1989 (NS, 111–17). The earlier articles are: Unnamed eds, ‘Ztroskotanci a 
samozvanci’, Rudé právo, 12 January 1977, 2; and Václav Doležal, ‘Tučná výslužka z Holandska’, Rudé právo, 22 November 
1986, 7 (not 22 November 1988, as stated in NS). The former of the two gave a particular political dimension to the terms 
ztroskotanci (down-and-outs) and samozvanci/samozvaný ([the] self-appointed), cited 8 times and 3 times, respectively, in Legacy 
Corpus. 
63 Havel had been imprisoned on 21 February 1989 for merely observing the demonstrations marking the anniversary of Palach’s 
suicide. 
64 Věra Schmiedtová, Malý slovník reálií komunistické totality (Prague, 2012), 115, defines pamflet, in the context of Communist 
speak, as ‘A defamatory leaflet, article, lampoon’. 
The authors argue that he wishes to return Czechoslovakia to a pluralist system 
(which he himself had stated in writing), with a view to reacquiring his family’s 
former wealth (which was wholly disingenuous). They conclude caustically: 
‘And so this is his concrete “model of the future”: the First Republic [1918–38], 
the pre-Munich political regime’.65 The failure to present a detailed account of 
Havel’s thinking is unsurprising, given that his views would have had a wider 
resonance than the Party line, but it also left the public demanding further 
information. Even Zdeněk Hoření, who played no small part in directing the 
campaign against Havel, subsequently claimed to have regretted that Rudé právo 
wrote about texts, such as Charter 77 and Několik vět, which were not in the 
public domain.66 A fellow (more forthright) former apparatchik, and head of the 
Ideological Department of the Central Committee, Jaroslav Jeník, went so far as 
to depict the invective against Havel and his family as clumsy and primitive.67 
The attacks on dissident organizations were sometimes even more vitriolic. K 
231 and KAN came in for particular criticism. Both were accused of nefarious 
plans to return Czechoslovakia to its pre-1938 status. For example, a piece in 
May 1988 refers to the principal representatives of K 231 as bývalí agenti, špióni, 
organizátoři diverzí, ilegálních bojůvek (former agents, spies, organizers of 
diversionary activities and of illegal armed groups).68 The vocabulary could just 
as easily have been from the early 1950s as from the late Gorbachev period. The 
noun agent is cited 23 times in Legacy Corpus (including 3 times in the phrase 
agent-chodec [courier]); špión/špionáž (spy, espionage) and derivatives, 18 
times; diverze (diversion) and cognates, 10 times; ilegální (illegal), 11 times; and 
bojůvky (commandoes), twice. The level of detail in the accounts of the 
opposition activities, such as the number of a bank account used by K 231, is 
intended to impart authority to the descriptions. The texts themselves, which are 
unchallengeable in the absence of relevant alternative sources of information, 
contribute little of value to public knowledge.69 Particular attention is paid to a 
K 231 operative, Otakar (Ota) Rambousek, who left Czechoslovakia in 1948, 
returned as an American agent, and re-emigrated after August 1968. 70  The 
specifics of his anti-Communist escapades are of limited relevance here, but the 
lack of reference to his role in the Prague Uprising in May 1945, and to his 15 
years in a Czech prison, constitute a striking omission from the account. Equally 
noteworthy is the discussion of a book by Rambousek, which happens to have 
recently fallen into the hands of one of the contributors (Nedávno se mi dostala 
                                                          
65 ‘Kdo je Václav Havel’, 117: ‘To je tedy jeho konkrétní „model budoucnosti“: první republika, předmnichovský politický režim’. 
66 Vaněk and Urbášek, Vítězové? Poražení?, 138–71 (p. 164). On 28 January 1977, many leading names in Czech culture were 
asked to assemble in the National Theatre to the so-called Anti-Charter, ‘For new creative activities in the name of socialism and 
peace’, without having seen the original document. 
67 Vaněk and Urbášek, Vítězové? Poražení?, 310–17 (p. 310). 
68 See Jaroslav Kojzar and Arnošt Bak, ‘„K 231“ Stahovat kůži zaživa...’, 21 May 1988 (NS, 78–82 [p. 79]). 
69 Ibid., 79. 
70 See František Vrbecký, ‘Jeden z K 231’, 13 August 1988 (NS, 83–86). 
do rukou kniha), despite being effectively banned by the authorities.71 The work, 
which comprises a series of stories told from the perspective of prisoners 
sentenced for spying, was produced by the reviled 68 Publishers in Toronto, and 
includes a number of descriptions in colloquial Czech, to which the reader 
apparently takes objection.72 Another contributor to Rudé právo picks up the 
thread, and asserts: ‘The memory of those who fought on the side of the nascent 
socialist state cannot be sullied by people of such [low] moral and personal 
qualities as Rambousek and his ilk’.73 
Other victims of the official opprobrium included the Union of Czechoslovak 
Writers, whose ‘manifesto’ in 1967 ‘constituted an inflammatory campaign 
against socialist Czechoslovakia’ (posloužil ke štvavé kampani proti 
socialistickému Československu). The said manifesto was the proceedings of the 
Union’s Fourth Congress in Prague from 27 June to 29 June 1967.74 Amongst 
the writers who contributed to this extraordinary cultural event were Eduard 
Goldstücker (1913–2000), best known perhaps for his role in the rehabilitation 
of Franz Kafka in 1963.75 Goldstücker, who emigrated to Britain in 1968, is 
accused of manipulating ‘radical’ students, and of using ‘sophisticated 
demagoguery’ (rafinovaná demagogie) to charge ‘conservatives’ in the Party 
with anti-Semitic views.76 A further target of the Normalizers’ censure was the 
prolific journalist and writer Ferdinand Peroutka (1895–1978), a supporter of 
Masaryk’s ‘Castle’ group in the First Republic, who left Czechoslovakia in 1948, 
and directed the Czech section of Radio Free Europe from 1951 to 1961. Vaněk 
cites Peroutka’s (seemingly) prophetic words about the legacy of Czech 
journalists in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact occupation: ‘I think that nothing 
will remain of our work, save for disgusting stains on the window, resembling 
those left by flies in the autumn’.77 Another individual singled out for strong 
criticism was Petr Uhl, a Trotskyist and co-founder of Charter 77. Kojzar accuses 
Uhl of demogogic misuse of the slogan samosprávná společnost (social self-
governance), of working with the Fourth International, as well as with KOR (The 
Workers’ Defence Committee) and Solidarity in Poland, and of employing 
‘pseudo-revolutionary phrases’ (pseudorevoluční fráze) to conceal his aim of 
overthrowing the socialist estalishment.78  
                                                          
71 Jiří Mikša, ‘Ti z druhé strany: Krochnu s sebou!’, 2 July 1988 (NS, 87–88 [p. 87]). 
72 Ota Rambousek, Krochnu s sebou (Toronto, 1978). 
73 František Koranda, ‘Na dráze špióna: Jak to bylo s „krochnou“?’, 12 November 1988 (NS, 89–90 [p. 90]): ‘Památka těch, kteří 
bojovali na straně rodícího se socialistického státu, nesmí být pošpiněna lidmi takových morálních a charakterových kvalit, 
jakými jsou Rambousek a jemu podobní’. 
74 Marie Boudová, ‘Nezastíraný útok proti vedoucí úloze strany’, 23 October 1987 (NS, 26–27 [p. 26]). For the proceedings of the 
Writers’ Congress, see Otakar Mohyla, ed., IV. sjezd Svazu československých spisovatelů (Prague, 1968). 
75 Franz Kafka: Liblická konference 1963, ed. Eduard Goldstücker (Prague, 1963). 
76 Antonín Vaněk, ‘Říkali si radikálové’, 4 June 1988 (NS, 101–03 [p. 103]); and Jiří Stáno, ‘Jak to předpověděl Ferdinand Peroutka: 
Skvrny jako po mouchách’, 14 July 1988 (NS, 91–96 [p. 92]). 
77 Stáno, ‘Jak to předpověděl Ferdinand Peroutka’, 95: ‘Myslím, že po nás nezůstane nic kromě odporných skvrn na okně, jež se 
podobají těm, které zůstávají na podzim po mouchách’. Little did Peroutka know that his contributions would once again inform 
Czech journalism after 1989. 
78 Jaroslav Kojzar, ‘Avanturista z tzv. Čtvrté internacionály: Pod maskou pseudorevoluční fráze’, 18 June 1988 (NS, 106–10). 
The reference to Trotskyism – a concept which was virtually taboo in the 
MarxistLeninist lexicon – is indicative of the limitations on the Party’s ability to 
control the direction of political discourse. 
The Communists’ defamation of their adversaries was aimed in no small 
measure at distracting attention from their own failings. They had relatively little 
positive to proclaim for their 40 years in power, and much to conceal. For 
example, in 1990, GDP (in US dollars) per capita in Czechoslovakia was just 
3563, compared with 21,481 in Austria and 21,301 in Germany, and male life 
expectancy was 67.63 years in the Czech Republic and  
66.78 in Slovakia, compared with 72.47 and 72.08 in Austria and Germany.79 
However, as long as they enjoyed a monopoly position, they could largely persist 
with their own representation of reality, irrespective of whether or not it was 
credible. Their constant evocation of the defining phenomena of the late 1960s 
was intended to reinforce the official interpretation of the past. Amongst the 
examples cited in Rudé právo were the all-state meeting (celostátní aktiv) of the 
Lidové milice (people’s militia) in June 1968; the letter expressing loyalty to the 
Soviet Union, signed by 99 employees and family members of the Auto-Praga 
Factory in Vysočany (out of a total workforce of 4500!), and published in Pravda 
in July 1968; and the gathering of ‘decent and honourable people’ (poctiví a 
čestní lidé) (that is, hardliners) at the Lucerna Palace on 10 November 1968.80 
Other selected moments in the rebuilding of monolithic socialism included the 
meeting of the Central Committee in November 1968, the publication of the 
Central Committee weekly ideological and political journal, Tribuna (1969–89), 
and the appointment of Husák as First Secretary in April 1969.81 
By the late 1980s, the authority of the Party was so damaged that it 
increasingly sought to go beyond its traditional remit and to draw on additional 
sources of information to impart greater legitimacy to its diktats. Two methods 
employed to limited effect were the increased use of eye-witness accounts and 
references to non-Communist sources. The former consisted largely of the 
memories of readers who stuck loyally to the Party line.82 (Sadly, there is no 
record of letters sent to Rudé právo which deviated from this line.) None of the 
readers’ letters presents much that is new, but the passion and more personalized 
                                                          
79  See ‘Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Czechoslovakia’, 8 June 2012, accessed 1 October 2014, http://kushnirs. 
org/macroeconomics/gdp/gdp_czechoslovakia.html#main 3; and Emil Ginter, Vladimir Simko, and Ladislava Wsolova, ‘Fall of 
the Iron Curtain: Male Life Expectancy in Slovakia, in the Czech Republic and in Europe’, Central European Journal of Public 
Health 17.4 (2009): 171–74 (p. 172), accessed 1 October 2014, http://apps.szu. cz/svi/cejph/archiv/2009-4-01-full.pdf. 
80 See especially Unnamed eds, ‘Obrana i rozvoj socialismu – nedělitelný úkol’, 19 August 1988 (NS, 203–12 [p. 207]); Václav 
Pergl, ‘Naše přátelství chráníme jako oko v hlavě’, 16 August 1988 (NS, 47–50); and Marie Boudová, based on an account by 
Jarmila Pešková, ‘Oslavy velkého října v pražské Lucerně před 20 lety: Sjednocování poctivých a čestných lidí’, 16 November 
1988 (NS, 51–53). The letter by the 99 Auto-Praga affiliates, ‘«Nashu druzhbu my khranim, kak zenitsu oka»’, Pravda, 30 July 
1968, 2, was used as a pretext for military intervention. 
81 See Karel Horák, ‘Nad rezolucí Listopadového zasedání ÚV KSČ v roce 1968: Důležitý mezník v boji o překonání krize’, 14 
November 1988 (NS, 54–58); Miloslav Vítek, ‘Před dvaceti lety začala vycházet Tribuna: Historie mluví k dnešku’, 11 January 
1989 (NS, 59–62); and Pergl, ‘Naše přátelství chráníme’, 50. 
82 See Vzpomínky čtenářů – pamětníků (NS, 137–60). 
nature of some of the contributions offers a degree of contrast to the dry, 
hectoring tone of the professional journalists. Typical is the short piece by 
Květoň, entititled Tak to cítím já (That’s what I feel), exhorting people to learn 
the lessons of 1968, which includes the phrases pro mnohé z nás (for many of 
us), svým vlastním podpisem (with my own signature), and mrzí mne, že (I am 
sorry that).83 Květoň’s letter concludes ‘It is very [moc] necessary to explain, to 
inform, constantly to return to the essence of the crisis and, above all, to draw 
from it the correct conclusions for our policies today’.84 Note the rhetorical use 
of parallelism and the colloquialism moc. In a similarly informal stylistic vein is 
Holečková-Dolejší’s denunciation of the opposition’s tactics during the Prague 
Spring, which includes the lines ‘In August 1968, my husband and I, with our 
four-year-old granddaughter, were in a cottage near Benešov [Central Bohemia]. 
When we learnt about the international assistance of our allies, we breathed a 
sigh of relief’.85 
Amongst the themes to emerge from the personal accounts of the past are the 
gratuitous disrespect shown to Communist figureheads, such as ex-president 
Gottwald and the journalist and writer Julius Fučík; the lessons learnt from the 
old guard; the continued validity of Poučení; resistance to reform Communism; 
threats, intimidation, and aggression against opponents of reform; and so forth. 
Particularly noticeable is the almost sycophantic veneration of the founding 
fathers of socialism, variously referred to as ‘pre-war members of the KSČ’ 
(předváleční členové KSČ), ‘older and merited [Party] members’ (starší a 
zasloužilí členové), and ‘steeled comrades’ (zocelení soudruzi).86 The irony of 
the fact that the Stalinist policies of the erstwhile Party leadership had led to the 
imprisonment of their then president, Husák, as well as to the suffering of so 
many other senior Communists and sympathizers, and had been a major stimulus 
for the Prague Spring, was lost on the contributors. Like Husák himself, the letter 
writers willingly suspended disbelief, in the name of an ideology in which they 
had unquestioning faith. 
The second technique used by the Party hacks to give a greater semblance of 
authority to their texts was to refer to a wider range of western, émigré and 
underground sources, either unavailable to the general public, or officially 
frowned upon by the state. These included, amongst others, the journals 
Aussenpolitik, Foreign Affairs, Life, and Svoboda; the newspapers Le Figaro, 
Literární noviny, The New York Times, and The Sunday Times; the international 
news agencies AFP, Reuters, and UPI; the broadcasters Austrian television 
                                                          
83 Miloslav Květoň, ‘Tak to cítím já’, 17 August 1988 (NS, 143). 
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85 Božena Holečková-Dolejší, ‘Hrst vzpomínek na rok 1968’, 14 May 1988 (NS, 153–55 [p. 154]): ‘Byli jsme v srpnu 1968 s 
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obstáli’, 23 April 1988 (NS, 156–58 [p. 158]); and Olga Simová, ‘Za věrnost straně’, 17 August 1988 (NS, 144). 
(ORF), the BBC, and Svobodná Evropa; and books such as Ota Šik’s Třetí cesta 
(The Third Way), Jaroslav Brodský’s Řešení gama (The Gamma Solution), and 
Petr Uhl’s Program společenské samosprávy (The Programme of the Self-
Governing Society). For example, Kojzar writes at some length about Leon 
Trotsky’s polemical work, The Permanent Revolution, while Matouš draws on 
the wisdom of Ota Šik to deride Dubček: ‘O. Šik declared in an interview 
broadcast on the BBC on 13 December 1987 that “Dubček was weak and unable 
to lead, and devoid of his own views and convictions”’.87 The paradox of quoting 
Šik’s opinions on Dubček, as mediated through the airwaves of the BBC, cannot 
have gone unnoticed by more perceptive readers. Nor could they have failed to 
appreciate the injustice of the journalists’ privileged access to information. From 
the point of view of the Party propagandists, the dissemination of restricted 
knowledge was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enabled them to show 
their responsiveness to change, and their preparedness to extend the parameters 
of debate; on the other, it highlighted the existence of inaccessible alternative 




Two apparently contradictory deductions can be made from the findings 
presented in this article. On the surface, nothing much had changed. The old 
guard was still firmly in control. It was prepared to countenance and even 
promote economic reform, but it was not willing to loosen its hold on power or 
to jeopardize the leading role of the Party. The content and the style of the 
ideology remained uncompromising. Communists were still depicted as poctiví 
lidé (the decent people) and čestní lidé (the honourable people) – phrases cited 
10 times and 14 times, respectively – while the opposition was dismissed as 
pravicoví oportunisté (right-wing opportunists), nepřátelé (enemies), and worse. 
To all except the more astute observers, Czechoslovakia remained in the grip of 
hardline totalitarian rule. Yet, below the surface, something had shifted. A close 
reading of the contributions to Rudé právo shows that the Party was now on the 
defensive. Instead of setting and controlling the agenda, it was responding to 
external events. The invocation of the spirit of Poučení may have appeared 
apposite in view of the twentieth anniversary of 1968, but it was necessitated by 
unwelcome comparisons between the Prague Spring and Gorbachev’s reforms. 
People were still, of course, afraid of the security apparatus, but they were 
emboldened by developments throughout the Communist world, and 
increasingly rejected the official interpretation of reality. The ‘coded’ message 
of the approved discourse no longer held sway to the extent that it had in the past. 
                                                          
87 Kojzar, ‘Avanturista z tzv. Čtvrté internacionály’; and Matouš, ‘Dubčekova cesta’, 126: ‘O. Šik prohlásil v rozhovoru vysílaném 
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The contributors to Rudé právo had no option other than to respond in some 
measure to the transformation in the public mood, and to engage at some level 
with their opponents. This engagement included extending the range of 
legitimate themes for discussion, broadening the evidence base for their 
assertions, and allowing more accounts of personal experiences. It also involved 
a number of subtle changes in the use of language, including the introduction of 
expressions previously confined to the private sphere, such as 
disident/disidentský (once misspelt as desedent), cited 6 times. Greater 
recognition was likewise given to the contrast between the negative epithets 
applied by the opposition to the Communist leadership, such as dogmatici 
(dogmatists) and figuríny z panoptika (waxwork figures), and the more positive 
terms used of the reformers, such as obroditelé (revivalists) and progresivisté 
(progressives). However, the more the Party apologists opened up dialogue and 
used their detractors’ terms of reference, the more people craved greater freedom 
of information and rejected the prescriptiveness of the establishment. The 
success of the existing canonical discourse had been attributable to a combination 
of strict state control, fear, and public resignation, which were contingent on the 
continued adherence of the Soviet Union to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Once 
Gorbachev had rejected the principle of armed intervention in other socialist 
countries, Czechoslovakia no longer had any reason to defer to the Kremlin or to 
endorse Marxism-Leninism. The best that the supporters of Normalization could 
do was to adopt a kind of holding position in the hope that the political situation 
in the USSR would change in their favour. 
This article has sought to show the difficulty for the Communist leadership of 
reconciling two antithetical versions of reality: one based on stability and 
continuity at all costs; the other on the need to embrace externally enforced 
change. The Party’s insistence on superimposing its own ideological precepts of 
the past on its vision of the future rendered meaningful reform (even in the 
economic sphere) virtually impossible. The study contends that the tensions 
existing between the two diametrically opposed forces operating in politics were 
reflected, albeit marginally, in the rhetoric and argument of Rudé právo. It further 
maintains that the ‘authoritative discourse’ model represents a particularly useful 
analytical framework for evaluating the impact of ideological language in the 
context of the Communist system. The model asserts that the repetition of 
hypernormalized empty phrases can achieve a degree of social cohesion, based 
on acquiescence and passivity, as long as the ruling elite has the means to impose 
its a priori conceptions and policies on the population at large. As soon as 
alternative perspectives begin to inform the debate, the authority of the official 
word quickly breaks down, and demands for more substantive change become 
irresistible. The refusal of the Party to polemicize seriously with its opponents 
for so long might have seemed counter-productive to more liberal-minded 
Communists, but it almost certainly delayed the demise of the regime. 
